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ABSTRACT 
There is no “one size fits all” solution for verifying space avionics systems to ensure safety and 
mission success. This paper presents a verification approach based on MEAL and risk posture 
for space systems. MEAL refers to Mission, mission Environment, Application, and Lifetime of 
the application. In addition to the description of the verification approach, the paper also 
provides the awareness of the different levels of risks associated with verification tests and 
inspections when performed at part-, board- and box-level, and discusses the applications of the 
approach for flight heritage verification, commercial off the shelf (COTS) verification and 
radiation-effects verification. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
There is a trend of sacrificing rigor in verification testing to meet mission cost and schedule 
constraints, and this trend can place projects at high-risk. Current and emerging aerospace, space 
scientific and human exploration projects continue to face new performance demands and new 
technological challenges. These technological challenges combined with finite budgets and 
limited schedules are forcing designers, scientists, engineers, and managers to push technologies 
to their physical limits. At the same time, budget and schedule pressures challenge how those 
technologies/missions are verified.   
A clear understanding of verification processes is needed to ensure proper verification of the 
technology for the mission (i.e., capabilities, advantages, and limitations).  The goal of 
verification is to prove through test, analysis, inspection, and/or demonstration that a product 
provides its required function and meets performance requirements. It is important that 
verification yield understanding of representative performance under worst-case conditions so 
that margins to failure can be evaluated for proposed applications.  The capabilities, advantages, 
and limitations of the testing and inspection performed at each integration level are different, and 
the risk incurred by omitting a verification step depends on the level of integration as well as 
Mission, Environment, Application and Lifetime (MEAL) [1].   
This paper focuses on verification processes, with the goal of ensuring safe implementation of 
avionics technologies, giving proper consideration to a project’s MEAL and project risk posture.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180007359 2019-08-31T18:13:04+00:00Z
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2. MEAL AND RISK POSTURE  
MEAL refers to Mission, mission Environment, Application, and Lifetime of the application. 
Risk posture is the position project management is willing to take based on the MEAL and 
identified risks.  
2.1 MEAL 
MEAL is defined as below:  
Mission:  The ultimate science goal or objective of the overall effort. The “mission” in the 
MEAL acronym identifies what type/kind of mission: human or robotic mission, mission 
category and payload classifications, and level of risk is the mission willing to take. Different 
types of missions often have different sets of requirements, standards, and test criteria. 
Understanding the mission helps define the requirements associated with the environment, the 
applications to meet the mission goals, and the expected progression of the mission from 
development to decommissioning. The mission also defines the risk posture, which is the 
position the mission is willing to take based on the identified MEAL risks. There is no single, 
uniform standard for risk posture, and depending on the mission, risk posture is often tailored to 
mission applications and needs.   
Environment:  The relevant ambient conditions the system would experience during its life cycle 
to accomplish the mission (e.g., thermal effects, electromagnetics effects, electrostatic effects, 
radiation effects, etc.). 
The mission environment is critical for avionics technologies as it defines the stresses 
experienced and ensures an understanding of the required operating environment, non-operating 
conditions and performance thresholds and margins. Environmental performance specifications 
relative to the mission environment must be defined to maintain required design margins. 
Application: Specific function(s) to be executed to meet the goals of the mission. The mission 
application includes the architecture, its redundancy requirements and parts technologies. This 
enables proper use of parts for the application/function and gives designers an understanding of 
how the parts function and interact at all levels, from the individual part up through the system 
level. 
Lifetime: The total time during which the system must perform its intended functions, including 
subcomponent manufacturing, systems development, system implementation, system 
execution/operations, and retiring of the system to accomplish the mission. 
The mission lifetime defines the criteria for avionics technologies including EEE parts to be 
selected, applied, and tested for missions, so that premature failures do not affect the mission 
outcome and wear-out effects do not shorten its duration. These considerations help designers 
understand of how to size the lifespan of parts and use them in a given architecture. 
The understanding of the MEAL requires a complete synchronous picture of effective use of 
avionics technologies. The MEAL suggests appropriate strategies for mission design, 
development, implementation, and even defines end-of-mission conditions. It also 
informs/bounds the verification approach and processes through all stages. The selected 
verification processes must ensure the adequacy of the design is commensurate with the risk the 
project is willing to accept. 
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2.2 Risk Matrix and Risk Posture 
For a NASA spaceflight project, the risk matrix is a management tool for communicating how 
individual issues (e.g., schedule, cost, and technical) related to a given mission are classified and 
prioritized to one another.  The risk matrix main components are: 1) the probability/likelihood of 
failing to achieve a particular outcome, and 2) the consequence/impact of failing to achieve that 
outcome. NASA does not have a specific risk matrix for all missions, but has allowed each 
project to develop their own matrix to fit their given mission requirements based on the 
respective MEAL. As one example, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) defined 
“Risk” as a measure of the potential inability to achieve overall project objectives within defined 
constraints. Figure 1 presents the NESC risk matrix and related definitions of the matrix 
elements [2]. 
 
Figure 1. NESC Risk Matrix and Related Definitions of the Matrix Element Definitions [2] 
The primary risk impact/consequence areas considered in this paper are crew safety and health, 
mission success or technical performance, and programmatic as listed in the Table 1.  
Table 1.  Elements of Mission Risk Posture Impact/Consequence Areas  
Mission Type 
Risk Impact/Consequence 
Safety & Health 
Mission Success or 
Technical Performance 
Programmatic 
Human-rated 
Exploration 
LOC LOM COST/SCHEDULE 
Robotic Exploration LOM LOM COST/SCHEDULE 
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Programmatic risk impact/consequence includes cost and schedule for human-rated and robotic 
explorations.  Risk impact/consequence for human exploration missions include loss of crew 
(LOC) and loss of mission (LOM) in Safety & Health, and Mission Success or Technical 
Performance, while robotic exploration missions focus primarily on LOM impact/consequence. 
Risk posture is the position project management is willing to take based on the MEAL and 
identified risks. There is no standard for risk posture, and depending on the mission, the 
approach taken is often tailored based on the mission applications and needs (e.g., human-rated 
versus robotic, launch vehicle versus spacecraft).  
3. Verification based on MEAL and Risk Posture 
The MEAL and risk posture based verification process applies to any avionics technology 
system verification. There is no “one size fits all” solution for the selection and verification of 
the avionics system and technology to ensure safety and mission success.  
The verification of the avionics system and technology in spaceflight projects should begin with 
the mission definition and its related MEAL, along with the acceptable risk associated with the 
mission category and/or payload class. These factors influence the design, development, 
integration, implementation, end-of-mission conditions, and verification process throughout all 
these stages. The purpose of verification is to show by analysis, demonstration, inspection, 
and/or test [3] that hardware will perform satisfactorily in the expected MEAL and that minimum 
workmanship standards have been met in accordance with the project risk posture. 
Verification processes should show that the end product conforms to its specified requirements at 
all levels, i.e., part-, board-, box-, subsystem-, and system-level.  
A list of common verification tests and inspections performed at different integration levels, i.e., 
the part-, board- and box-level, is summarized in reference [1], along with the purpose of the 
procedures, capabilities, advantages, and limitations if performed at part-, board-, and box-level. 
When properly implemented, these tests ensure that the given technology can be safely used on 
the given flight project with acceptable risks even in safety critical spaceflight applications.  
While reference [1] has all details regarding the verification tests and inspection at different 
integration levels and the associated risks, typically the “cost to test” decreases and “cost and 
schedule impact to fix” increases as the test is performed higher levels of integration. This is 
partly because of the number of independent tests required decreases when moving to higher 
levels of testing. The test cost can be lower, but the cost and schedule consequences of 
experiencing a failure increase dramatically. Cost savings will be realized only if no failures are 
detected during testing at the higher integration level, assuming this higher integration level 
testing is sufficient to catch individual parts that could fail during a mission. If there were any 
failures detected at a higher level, then it would negatively impact cost and schedule. Moreover, 
vulnerabilities not detected during verification process may lead to adverse consequences 
ranging from degraded performance to catastrophic failure. 
Improper verification of the avionics system and technology can occur due to lack of 
understanding the project’s MEAL, risk posture, or avionics technology, skipping verification 
testing at different integration level(s), or taking vendor technical and/or qualification data at 
face value without sufficient evidence or understanding. This can expose projects to unknown 
risks arising from the implementation/use of these technologies. At the same time, the more 
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complex the avionics system, the more MEAL-dependent will be the conclusion of the analysis 
of verification data.    
The MEAL suggests appropriate strategies for mission design, development, implementation, 
and defines end-of-mission conditions. It also informs/bounds the verification approach and 
processes through all stages. The understanding of the MEAL requires a complete synchronous 
picture of the effective use of the avionics technologies. Emphasizing one of the MEAL elements 
without understanding the others can compromise system integrity and performance and impact 
mission success.  
4. Applications of MEAL-based Verification 
The MEAL and risk posture based verification process applies to any avionics technology and 
system verification. As examples, applications of flight heritage verification, COTS verification 
and radiation effect verification are discussed below.  
4.1 Application #1: MEAL-based Verification for Flight Heritage 
The following two notional scenarios illustrate the MEAL-based verification to assess heritage. 
A successfully flown technology is considered to have achieved TRL 6 or higher (TRL refers to 
Technology Readiness Level [4]). Each figure represents the respective MEAL boundaries. 
Scenario 1: The Blue Round Mission was successfully flown. The Orange Star Mission wants to 
use the same technology. Since the Orange Star Mission characteristics (i.e., Environment, 
Application and Lifetime) are bounded within the Blue Round mission, the technology would be 
considered at TRL 6 or higher.  
 
Figure 4. MEAL-based Verification for Flight Heritage Scenario 1.  
Scenario 2: The Grey Square Mission was successfully flown.  The Purple Triangle Mission 
wants to use the same technology. Although the Application and expected Lifetime 
characteristics of the Purple Triangle Mission are bounded within the Gray Square Mission, the 
Environment is not.  Therefore, for the Purple Triangle Program, the technology would revert to 
the appropriate TRL. 
 
Figure 5. MEAL-based Verification for Flight Heritage Scenario 2.  
Table 3 illustrates MEAL-based verification step-by-step process to assess flight heritage 
technology by using four examples, (b), (c), (d) and (e).  
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Example (b): although heritage is often taken to apply to any previous successful flight 
experience, in reality the environment, application, and lifetime of the heritage mission must be 
equivalent or exceed the mission severity under consideration.   
Example (c): in the event that the application and lifetime are bounding, but the new mission is 
in a more severe environment, the assumed TRL is 4 because the technology has been 
established at the prototype or breadboard/experimental level.   
Example (d): if the new application is more severe than that for the heritage mission, then the 
assumed TRL is 3 because while the mission represents proof of concept, the technology 
requires validation for the intended application.   
Example (e): if the environment, application, and mission life of the new mission exceed those of 
the heritage mission, then the assumed TRL is 1.  
There are some scenarios not shown in Table 3. For example, if the environment and application 
are bounding, but the mission life is longer for the new mission, then the assumed TRL is 4 
because while the technology is validated in principle, the success of the technology for the new 
cumulative stresses and failure probabilities have not been.  
In summary, MEAL-based verification provides the steps required to qualify any design and 
could help assess whether the “heritage design” is or is not suitable for the given mission. To 
claim “heritage”, the previous mission’s characteristics must bound those of the new mission in 
terms of environment, application, and lifetime. If these bounds are not realized, then the new 
system would regress to the appropriate TRL and be certified/verified to the predicted conditions 
of new mission. 
Table 2.  MEAL-based Verification Step-by-Step Process to Assess Flight Heritage Technology. 
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e )
New 
Technology
Proposed New Mission MEAL (mission 
environment, application and expected 
lifetime) is equal or a subset of the 
previously flown mission MEAL, 
including identical concept, form fit, 
design,  interfaces, etc.
Proposed New Mission application and 
expected lifetime is equal or a subset 
of the previously flown mission, 
including identical concept, form fit, 
design,  interfaces, etc., but with an 
environment outside the previously 
flown mission.
Proposed New Mission MEAL  is equal 
or a subset of the previously flown 
mission MEAL, but with different 
application implementation (i.e. 
different design outside the previously 
flown like mechanical, thermal &/or 
electrical)
Design previously flown but different 
application, environment and lifetime 
(where the original application does 
not envelope the new application)
TRL # Description as stated  on  7120.5C
1 Basic principles observed and reported V&V Previous Data Available Previous Data Available Previous Data Available Previous Data Available
2
Technology concept and/or application 
formulated V&V Previous Data Available Previous Data Available Previous Data Available V&V
3
Analytical and experimental critical function 
and/or characteristic proof-of-concept V&V Previous Data Available Previous Data Available Previous Data Available V&V
4
Component and/or breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment V&V Previous Data Available Previous Data Available V&V V&V
5
Component and/or breadboard validation in 
relevant environment V&V Previous Data Available V&V V&V V&V
6
System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment V&V Previous Data Available V&V V&V V&V
7
System prototype demonstration in the real 
environment V&V V&V V&V V&V V&V
8
Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration V&V V&V V&V V&V V&V
9
Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations V&V V&V V&V V&V V&V
Comments:
Must undergo 
through the 
entire TRL 
process
Must verify system/subsystem under 
relevant environment (acceptance 
verification test)
Must validate component &/or 
Breadboard under relevant 
environment.
Must validate component &/or 
Breadboard under laboratory 
environment.
Must be treated as the new technology
Notes:
V&V
Previous Data Available 
Mission Examples
 Description
Must be validated and verified as per TRL Definitions and descriptions.
Validation data available from previously flown/validated system.  Requires Verification at all levels of implementation.
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4.2 Application #2: MEAL-based Verification for COTS Use in Spaceflight Projects 
Spaceflight projects are driven to use COTS avionics technologies to reduce design, 
development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) costs, to meet programmatic schedules, and increase 
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system performance. Meanwhile, with continued pressure to minimize DDT&E costs and 
undertake more complex spaceflight mission designs and interfaces (i.e., advanced architectures 
and more complicated parts), the potential for increased/unrecognized risk increases.    
In an Aerospace Corporation study [5], several dozen missions were reviewed and the evidence 
of a “No Fly” zone, characterized by increased failure rates, was found to exist when pressures to 
reduce Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) cost and programmatic schedule 
meet increased system complexity, as shown in Figure 6. The Aerospace team developed a 
“complexity index” based on considerations of mission characteristics, spacecraft size, power 
consumption, number of payloads, GN&C demands and data processing and throughput. This 
normalized index correlated with mission success and failure, giving strong indications of a no-
fly zone where complexity drove mission cost and schedule and where attempts to drive down 
these constraints tended to lead to mission failures [6]. 
 
Figure 6.  Evidence of "No Fly" Zone [5]. 
As demands for improved performance in spaceflight projects increase, the temptation has 
increased to implement new avionics technologies, including commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
technologies, into human-rated and robotic spaceflight projects. In addition, it is likely that the 
pressures will increase. Using complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technology 
as one example, the performance (e.g., speed, density, power, etc.) differences between CMOS 
COTS parts and radiation-hardened parts continues to expand. While commercial CMOS 
doubles in density roughly every 18 months, radiation hardened CMOS doubles in density every 
24 months, which means that radiation-hardened CMOS performance lags even further behind 
commercial technology, dropping another generation behind roughly every decade, shown in 
Figure 7.   
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Figure 7.  Comparison between Commercial and Radiation-Hardened CMOS Technologies [6]. 
While state-of-the-art COTS parts can increase system performance and capabilities, they also 
can dramatically increase system complexity to the point where characterization of the part, let 
alone the system, for all logical and operating states become practically impossible. The system 
state space complexity increases exponentially with the part complexity, and access to 
information about individual part performance and margins to failure decreases. This makes full 
characterization for board- or box-level testing with complex parts a daunting problem.  
Limited understanding of COTS technology and how they perform in the mission environment 
over the design lifetime may lead to incomplete verification processes. NASA has successfully 
used COTS parts in mission critical applications throughout the Agency’s history.  This has been 
achieved by careful selection, qualification, and screening of the parts to meet the missions’ 
requirements as well as careful system design to capitalize on the strengths of the COTS part 
while mitigating its weaknesses.  The level at which part performance must be verified to ensure 
it will work successfully is highly dependent on MEAL, the avionics architecture, and the part 
technology [8]. 
4.3 Application #3: MEAL-based Verification for Radiation Effects  
Threats that the space radiation environment poses to semiconductor devices in space missions 
can be divided into two broad categories: dose effects and single event effects (SEE). Dose 
effects, i.e., TID and displacement damage dose (DDD), result from cumulative exposure to the 
space radiation environment. As such, they behave like wear-out effects with failure rate 
increasing as the dose increases. In contrast, single-event effects (SEE) are the parts’ prompt 
responses to the passage of a single ionizing particle through a volume in the part sensitive to 
that SEE mode. 
4.3.1 TID, DDD, and SEE 
Radiation tests for TID, DDD, and SEE are all at least potentially destructive.  Therefore, such 
testing is done during qualification testing on a sample of parts representative of the flight parts.  
For TID and DDD, this usually means the test parts must belong to the same wafer diffusion lot 
as the flight parts.  For SEE, lot-to-lot differences in performance are not usually as significant as 
those for TID or DDD.  As long as the test parts are fabricated in the same process and with the 
same mask set as the flight parts, the test is likely to be valid.  Note that in some cases, lot-to-lot 
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and even part-to-part variation is significant for SEE and these situations require greater fidelity 
between test and flight parts. 
Radiation testing for SEE has different goals than that for TID or DDD.  TID and DDD are 
cumulative effects, and failures are usually preceded by gradual parametric and functional 
degradation.  Thus, the goals of TID and DDD testing are to determine which parameters/ 
functions degrade and the part-to-part variation in that degradation at each dose step.  If parts are 
tested to failure (either parametric or functional), then the part-to-part variation in the failure 
dose is also of interest.  Mitigation of TID and DDD involves adding shielding or taking other 
steps (e.g., selecting operating conditions) to ensure that the dose on the part remains low enough 
that the probability of failure or degradation affecting the part’s ability meet requirements is 
negligible.   
In contrast, SEE can occur at any time in the device with equal probability (per ion).  As such, 
the primary goal of SEE testing is to identify all the SEE modes to which the part may be 
susceptible.  Thus, independent of whether the radiation environment is severe or benign, the test 
will irradiate the part to ion fluences much higher than will be seen during the mission.  SEE test 
methods are specifically tailored to include conditions where a given SEE mode is likely to occur 
if the device under test is susceptible.   For example, if the device under test includes CMOS 
(which can be susceptible to single event latch-up — SEL), some test runs will be performed 
with high fluences (i.e., greater than 107 ions per cm2) of highly ionizing (i.e., high-linear energy 
transfer (LET)) ions. These runs would be performed with the worst-case conditions for causing 
SEL in the DUT. Once this susceptibility is detected, then it is measured for a variety of ion 
species, energies, LETs, and angles of incidence.  These data are used to estimate the probability 
of each SEE mode occurring in the mission radiation environment application and lifetime.   
4.3.2 Radiation Testing at Different Configuration Levels 
Whether parts are tested at the part-, board-, or box-level affects the extent to which the goals 
outlined in the previous section can be met by testing.  First, board- and box-level studies are 
often performed with a single sample of the board or box.  This makes it impossible to assess 
how part-to-part variation would affect flight board/box performance unless there is high 
confidence part-to-part variation is negligible for all parts on the board.  Even if multiple test 
units are irradiated, the interactions between parts with different variability on the boards makes 
it difficult to interpret the results and bound flight unit performance. 
Radiation of higher-level assemblies also precludes optimizing the test to detect particular 
susceptibilities in any given technology. Moreover, parts on a board may only be susceptible to 
some failures for a fraction of the boards’ operating conditions. For example, if any part on a test 
board is bipolar, it is potentially susceptible to enhanced low dose rate sensitivity, in which parts 
degrade more severely at low dose rates (e.g., in space) than at high dose rates (e.g., in an 
accelerated TID test).  This means that the entire test must be conducted at a low dose rate.  
Similarly, increasing board temperature and voltage may not be possible, and SEL testing would 
likely have to be done for realistic missions rather than bounding conditions. Test conditions and 
levels will be driven by the weakest parts in the test unit rather than by the level of hardness 
designers desire for the system.  
Nondestructive SEE modes and parametric degradation may also remain hidden in tests at the 
board- and box-level.  While it can be argued that such modes are not significant at the system 
level, they could have consequences if the hardware is in another logical or operating state when 
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they occur.  In general, the more complicated the test unit, the less likely it is that the tester will 
be able to cover the full state space of operations in an accelerated test.   
Not every radiation test can be performed at all integration levels. TID tests with gamma rays 
could be performed even for complex boxes as long as the beam is large enough to expose the 
entire test unit.  X-rays have less penetrating power than gamma rays, but are similarly suitable 
for part-, board- and box-level testing as long as the penetrating range of the radiation is much 
longer than the system size. A concern for multi-board systems is that a gamma ray or X-ray 
beam can be degraded as it passes through the forward boards, resulting in higher doses for the 
rear boards than the forward boards. Proton TID, DDD, and SEE tests can also be performed on 
integrated systems although the range of the protons must be considered (the range of a 200-
MeV is about 13.7 cm in Si).   
Heavy-ion SEE testing at levels of integration higher than the part level is problematic. Preparing 
parts on the board to ensure ions from conventional accelerators reach device sensitive volumes 
can compromise their structural integrity, making them unreliable and vulnerable to mechanical 
failures. In principle, a sufficiently broad, high-energy heavy-ion beam (e.g., like that at the 
NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL)) could effectively test parts at the board-level 
without modification, albeit with significant amounts of analysis required to account for beam 
degradation as it traverses various parts.  However, heavy-ion SEE testing at the multi-board or 
box-level is generally not feasible due to limited penetration ranges of the ions and the difficulty 
of modeling transport of the ions through complicated structures in the test unit.   
Board- and box-level tests must be designed around the limitations of the weakest part(s) in the 
system, which creates challenges for radiation testing.  This is especially true for board-level 
SEE tests, which are usually performed with high-energy protons due to their greater penetrating 
range, eliminating the difficulties with part/board preparation for heavy ion tests. Such a proton 
test cannot detect SEE modes caused only by moderately to highly ionizing particles (Z>14).  
However, even for modes that occur at low LET, only 1 of ~289000 protons creates a recoil ion 
(i.e., the secondary particle capable of causing the SEE) while every proton contributes to TID. 
To avoid board- or box-level failures due to TID-susceptible parts, the test will often need to be 
restricted to a low proton fluence (e.g., 1010 to 1011 cm-2).  Such low-fluence tests usually fail to 
reveal all, or even a representative sample, of the SEE susceptibilities in the system under test 
and on-orbit experience can differ dramatically from the test results, as seen in Figure 8.  
   
Figure 8. Simulated strikes of ions (red dots) overlaid on a photomicrograph 60 x 70 µm2 section of an Elpida 512 
Mbit SDRAM. Left: Recoil Ions due to 1010 Protons/cm2. Right: 107 ions/cm2 typical of heavy ion SEE test. 
Often, the softest parts to TID in the test unit that drive the low fluence requirements are linear 
bipolar components fabricated in large-dimension, older technologies.  These simple parts do not 
To be published in the proceeding for the 31st Aerospace Testing Seminar, Los Angeles, CA, October 22-25, 2018. 11 
 
usually require high ion fluences to characterize their SEE response.  In contrast, complex parts 
that require high fluences for SEE characterization are fabricated in more advanced 
microelectronic technologies that are usually much more tolerant to TID and remain functional at 
the high proton fluences required to provide adequate coverage of SEE modes.   
In general, the fluence required to adequately test a device scales with its complexity and the 
transistor count is often a good guide to device complexity. Transistor count scales roughly as 
the inverse square of the minimum feature size of the technology. 
However, there are other factors to consider (e.g., number of functions or operating modes).  A 
quad core processor with a given transistor count is likely less complicated than a single 
processor with the same transistor count.  Similarly, a static random access memory (SRAM) 
may be fabricated in an advanced CMOS process with high transistor density, but its architecture 
will be highly repetitive and, as such, it will not require as high a fluence to characterize its SEE 
response as would a less repetitive part with similar transistor count.  In contrast, although the 
memory array of a synchronous dynamic random-access memory (SDRAM) is highly repetitive, 
the part exhibits complex SEE behavior due to upsets in its control logic. 
Even if the testing is performed with ultra-high-energy heavy ions rather than protons, 
differential performance in the parts on the board (box-level testing is not possible with heavy 
ions currently available at any accelerator) can still complicate the task of thoroughly 
characterizing the board.  If one or more of the components on the board is susceptible to 
destructive or highly disruptive SEE modes, it may prevent the test from accumulating sufficient 
fluence or probing all of the full state space of the test unit.   
5.0 Summary 
This paper presents a verification approach based on MEAL and risk posture for space systems, 
provides the awareness of the different levels of risks associated with verification when 
performed at part-, board- and box-level, and discusses the applications on flight heritage 
verification, commercial off the shelf (COTS) verification and radiation effect verification. 
The MEAL and risk posture based verification process applies to any avionics technology 
system verification, including COTS technology and previously flown technology. There is no 
“one size fits all” solution for the selection and verification of the avionics system and 
technology to ensure safety and mission success.  
The MEAL suggests appropriate strategies for mission design, development, implementation, 
and defines end-of-mission conditions. It also informs/bounds the verification approach and 
processes through all stages. The selected verification processes must ensure the adequacy of the 
design is commensurate with the risk that is acceptable to the project. 
The understanding of the MEAL requires a complete synchronous picture of how avionics 
technologies are to be used effectively. Emphasizing one of the MEAL elements without 
understanding the others can compromise the integrity and performance of the system and the 
mission success.  
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